HOAG v. LAKE SHORE, &c., RAILROAD CO.

remove a bar or limitation which has already become completed,
and can pass no law to take effect on existing claims without allowing parties a reasonable time in which to bring their action before
such claims shall be barred by the new enactment; but within these
limits there is no restriction on the power of the legislature. Laws
quieting a long and undisputed possession of real estate are generally favored. Such laws give stability to titles, encourage improvements, and prevent the assertion of stale titles and claims. When
it is clear that the party in possession has brought himself within
the provisions of the statute, courts should have no hesitation in declaringhim the lawful occupant. In Spring v. Gray, 5 Mason 523,
Judge STORY says : "I

consider the Statute of Limitations a highly

beneficial statute, and entitled, as such, to receive, if not a liberal,
at least a reasonable construction in favor of its manifest object. It
is a statute of repose, the object of which is to suppress fraudulent
and stale claims from springing up at great distances of time, and
surprising the parties, or their representatives, when all proper
vouchers and evidence are lost, or the facts have become obscure
from the lapse of time, or the defective memory, or death or removal
of witnesses."
S. M.
FrxoreT, Neb.
RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
HOAG v. LAKE SHORE AND MICHIGAN SOUTHERN RAILROAD
COMPANY.
In questions of negligence, it is generally the province of the jury to determine
the proximity of the cause to the injury complained of; where, however, the
presence of an intervening agency is obvious, arising upon undisputed facts, the
court should take the case from the jury.
Defendants' railroad rim along the bank of Oil creek; by reason of a landslide, unseen by the engineer, an oil train was thrown from the track, the tank
cars burst, and the oil taking fire floated down the stream, causing the destruction of
plaintiff's buildings, several hundred feet distant from the place of the railroad
accident :
Reid, that the burning of plaintiff's buildings was not such a natural and probable consequence of the negligence of defendants' engineer (if negligence there
were), as ought to have been foreseen by him as likely to flow from his act, and,
therefore, plaintiffs could not recover.
Held further, that, the facts being undisputed, the evidence was properly not submitted to the jury.
Penns. RailroadCo. v. Hope, 80 Penn. St. 373, distinguished. Penna. Railroad
V. Kerr, 62 Penn. St. 353. followed.
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ERROR to the Common Pleas of Venango county.

This was an action on the case to recover compensation for certain property destroyed by fire, caused, as was alleged, by the negligence of the defendants. The facts were as follows: The plaintiffs
were the occupiers of a piece of land situate within the limits of
Oil City, on the western: bank of Oil creek. The railroad of defendants is constructed along said creek, over the land of the plaintiffs, and at the base of a high hill. On the afternoon of April
5th 1873, during a rain storm, there was a small slide of earth and
rock from the hill-side down to and upon the railroad. About ten
minutes prior to the accident one of the defendants' engines had
passed over the road in safety; at that time no slide had occurred.
This engine was followed in a few minutes by another engine,.
drawing a train of cars loaded with crude oil in bulk. The latter
engine ran into the slide, was thrown off the track, ran on about
one hundred to one hundred and fifty feet, when the tender, which
was in front of the engine, was overturned into Oil creek; the
engine itself was partly overturned; two or three oil cars became
piled up on the track and burst. The oil took fire, was carried
down the creek, then swollen by the rain, for several hundred feet,
set fire to the property of the plaintiffs, and partly consumed it.
The court below, on these facts, directed a verdict for defendants.
C.

W . Maccay, for plaintiffs.

.fcCalmont d Osborn, for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PAXSON, J.-The question of negligence in defendants' engineer
in not seeing the obstruction and stopping his train before reaching
it, is not raised upon this record, and need not be discussed.
The only question for our consideration is whether the negligence
of the defendants' servants was the proximate cause of the injury
to the plaintiffs' property. The answer to the plaintiffs' third point,
embraced in the second specification of error, raises this question
distinctly. The court was asked to say: "That,. if the jury believe
from the evidence that the accident complained of was the result of
negligence on the part of the defendants, and that, by reason of
such negligence, the oil, ignited by the engine attached to the
train, ran immediately down to Oil creek, where it was carried by
the current, in the space of a few minutes, to the property of the
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plaintiffs, when it set fire to and destroyed said property, the plaintiffs are entitled to recover, provided they did not in any manner
contribute to said accident." The court answered this point in the
negative, and then instructed the jury that as a matter of law upon
the facts in the case the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover;
which instruction is assigned here for error.
It was strongly urged that the court erred in withdrawing the
case from the jury, and the recent cases of PennsylvaniaRailroad
Co. v. ope, 80.Penn. St. 873, and Raydure v. Knight, 2 W. N.
C. 713, were cited as supporting this view. In the case first cited
it was said by the Chief Justice, in delivering the opinion of the
court: "We agree with the courtbelow that the question of proximity was one of fact particularly for the jury. How near or
remote each fact is to its next succeeding fact in the concatenation of
circumstances from the prime cause to the end of the succession of
facts which is immediately linked to the injury, necessarily must be
determined by the jury. These facts or circumstances constitute
the case and depend upon the evidence. The jury must determine,
therefore, whether the facts constitute a succession of events so
linked together that they become a natural whole, or whether the
chain of events is so broken that they became independent, and the
final result cannot be said to be the natural and probable consequence of the primary cause, the negligence of the defendants."
The case of Raydure v. Knight was meagerly presented; the charge
of the court was not sent up, and a majority of the court were- of
opinion that no sufficient cause for reversing the judgment had been
shown. I am unable to see any special bearing this case.has upon
the question before us. The doctrine laid down in The _ailroad
Co. v. Hope, and to be gathered incidentally perhaps from Raydure v. Knight, is, that the question of proximate cause is to be
decided by the jury upon all the facts in the case; that they are to
ascertain the relation of one fact to another and how far there is a
continuation of the causation by which the result is linked to the
cause by an unbroken chain of events, each one of which is the
iiatural, foreseen and necessary result of such cause.- But it has
never been held that when the facts of a case have been ascertained,
the court may not apply the law to the facts. This is done daily
upon special verdicts and reserved points. Thus, in The Railroad
Co. v. Kerr, 62 Penn. St. 353, a case bearing a striking analogy
to this, the court submitted the question of-negligence to the jury,
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but reserved the question of proximate cause upon the undisputed
facts of the case. Of course, this could not have been done if the
facts were in dispute. A reserved point must be based upon facts
admitted in the cause or found by the jury. In questions of negligence it has been repeatedly held that certain facts when established
amount to negligence per 8e: Railroad Co. v. Stinger, 78 Penn. St.
219; McCully v. Clarke, 4 Wright 899; Pennsylvania Railroad
Co. v. Bennett, 59 Penn. St. 259; while in Raydure v. Knight,
supra, the court below, in answer to the defendants' second point,
instructed the jury that if certain facts were believed by them, the
negligence complained of was the proximate cause of the injury to
plaintiffs' property. This ruling was affirmed by this court. I do
not understand the decision in The Railroad Co. v. Hope to be in
conflict with this view. It remains to apply this principle to the
case before us. There is not a particle of conflict in the evidence
so far as it affects the question of proximate cause. This was doubtless the reason why the plaintiffs assumed the facts in their third
point. They would not have been justified in doing so had not the
facts been admitted, nor is it likely the learned judge would have
answered it. We may, therefore, regard the plaintiffs' third point
as a prayer for instructions upon the undisputed facts of the case.
Can it be doubted that the court had the right to give a binding
instruction ? We think not.
But one question remains; was the negligence of the defendants'
servants, in not seeing the land-slide and stopping the train before
reaching it, the proximate cause of the destruction of the plaintiffs' property ? We need not enter into an extended discussion of
the delicate questions suggested by this inquiry. That has been
done so fully in two of the cas.es cited as to render it unnecessary.
A man's responsibility for his negligence and that of his servants
must end somewhere. There is a possibility of carrying an admittedly correct principle too far. It may be extended so as to reach
the reductio ad absurdum so far as it applies to the practical
business of life. We think this difficulty may be avoided by adhering to the principle substantially recognised in The Railroad Co.
v. Kerr, and The Railroad Co. v. Hope, supra, that in determining what is proximate cause, the true rule is, that the injury must
be the natural and probable consequence of the negligence, such a
consequence as under the surrounding circumstances of the case,
might and ought to have been foreseen by the wrongdoer as likely
VOL. XXVII.-28
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to flow from "

act.

This is not a limitation of the maxim causa

proxima non remota speetatur; it only affects its application.

There may be cases to which such a rule would not apply, but
this certainly is not one. It would be unreasonable to hold that
the engineer of the. train could have anticipated the burning
of the plaintiffs' property as a consequence likely to flow from his
negligence in not looking out and seeing the land-slide. The obstruction itself was unexpected. An engine had passed along
within ten minutes with a clear track. But the obstruction was
there, and the tender struck it. The probable consequences of the
collision, such as the engineer would have a right to expect, would
be the throwing the engine and a portion of the train off the track.
Was he to anticipate the bursting of the oil tanks, the oil taking
fire, the burning oil running into and being carried down the
stream, and the sudden rising of the waters of the stream, by
means of which, in part at least, the burning oil set fire to the
.plaintiffs' building'! This would be a severe rule to apply, and
might have made the defendants responsible for the destruction
of property for miles down Oil creek. The water was an intervening agent, that carried the fire just as the air carried, the sparks
in"the case of The Railroad Co. v. Kerr. It is manifest that the
negligence was the remote and not the proximate cause of the
injury to the plaintiffs' building. The learned judge ruled the case
upon sound principles, and his judgment is affirmed.
The doctrine of pitximate or remote
cause, in reference to liability for damages, has of late received considerable
discussion in cases arising out of fires
caused by the operation of railroads.
The leading cases upon one view of
the subject, are, Ryan -r. N. Y. Central
Railroad, 35 N. Y. 210, and Penna.
Railroadv. Kerr, 62 Penn. St. 353.
Ryan v. -ew York Central Railroad,
35 N. Y. 210, was a case where the defendant negligently set fire to an adjoining house, and the fire spreading,
ignited and consumed a neighboring
building; it was held by the court
that the cauqe of the fire was too remote to attach the liability to the defendant. Penna. Railroad Co. v. Kerr,
62 Penn. St. 353, was a case where

an engine on the railroad company's
track emitting sparks, by negligence
set fire to a dwelling close by ; the
fire from this house was communicated
tQ another house, at some little distance from it; the latter was consumed
with all its contents, and it was held
that the corporation was not liable
in damages for the house and contents
See also Macon
thereof last burned.
Railroad Co. v. McConnell, 27 Ga. 481,
which was a case involving substantially the same questions of negligence,
and in which the same rulings were
made as in Penna. Railroad Co. v. Kerr.
Penna. Railroad Co. v. Kerr, however, appeared to he somewhat narrowed
in its scope by a recent case before the
same court; Penna. Railroad Co. v.
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Hope, 80 Pa. St. 373, in which AGNEW,
C. J., stated the rule as to the determination of proximate or remote cause
to be "that the injury must he the natural and probable consequence of the
negligence, and that this might and
ought to have been foreseen under the
surrounding circumstances. * * * We
agree with the court below that the question of proximity was one of fact, particularly for the jury. How near or
how remote each fact is to its next succeeding fact in the concatenation of
circumstances, from the prime cause to
the end of the succession of facts which
is mediately linked to the injury, necessarily must be determined by the jury.
These facts or circumstances constitute
the case, and depend upon the evidence."
But the principal case shows that the
court has not receded in any degree from
the doctrine of Railroad Co. v. Kerr.
The effect of the cases in Pennsylvania
Isthat the question of proximate or remote cause is a question of fact to be
determined like other facts by the jury
from the evidence; but that in this class
of cases as in all others, when the facts
are agreed upon, or uncontroverted and
incontrovertible, the law is to be pronounced upon them by the court. In
Railroad Co. v. Hope, the facts were left
to the jury to find ; in Railroad Co. v.
Kerr, and in the principal case, the facts
being agreed or undisputed, the court
pronounced the result as matter of law.
With this distinction kept in view there
is no conflict between the cases.
The authority of the decisions in
-Penna.Railroad Co. v. Kerr, 62 Pa. St.
353, and Ryan v. X. Y. Central Railroad,
35 N. Y. 210, was denied in the recent
case of Small v. Chicago, R. L - P. Railroad Co., Supreme Court of Iowa, April
Term, 1878. That was a case where
the engine on the defendant's track,
emitting sparks, set fire to an elevator
adjoining the track, which spread from
thence to plaintiff's elevator and destroyed it. It was held that the fire

from the locomotive was the proximate
cause of the loss, and that the railroad
company was liable for the damages
thereby occasioned.
In a late case in Kansas, it was held
that where two fires were caused by the
engines of the defendant corporation,
said fires being caused by sparks from
the engines, and where neither of the
fires originated in plaintiff's land, but
were kindled on the lands of different
owners, and afterwards spread, and then
uniting, and passed over the property of
some other landowners, and finally
came to plaintiff's property, which was
four miles distant from where said fire
originated, and burned some out-houses
and other property, the court held that
the damage was not too remote, and
that plaintiff was entitled to recover:
Atcheson, T. J- S. T. Railroad Co. v.
&anford, 12 Kans. 354. In Peoppers
v. Missouri, Kansas 4- Texas Railroad
Co., 7 Cent. Law Journal 252, a case
where sparks from defendant's locomotive set fire to prairie along defendant's line, and a high wind blowing,
the fire extended three miles during
the evening, burning slowly during the
night-again, in the morning, the wind
rising, drove the fire about four miles
further, where it reached plaintiff's farm,
and destroyed his property; in an action for damages for the destruction of
plaintiff's property, in which the question of negligence was raised, held that
the facts prima facie showed negligence
on part of the defendant, and that the
damage by the fire must be considered
as the direct and natural result therefrom, * * * and that the high wind at
that season of the year, although aiding
in the spread of the fire, was neither extraordinary or remarkable, and could
not be regarded as the introduction of
a new agency, so as to relieve the railroad company from the result of the
negligence of its servants in permitting
the fire to escape from its-engine.
In England, in the case of Jones v.
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FestiniogRailway Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. 733;
it is held that a railroad company, having no express authority to use steam or
any other power necessitating the use of
fire, is liable for any damages occasioned
by the escape of fire from its engines without regard to the question of negligence.
And this is made expressly so by statute
in some of the states. In Maine, see
Stearns v. Atlantic, 4-c., Railroad Co.,
46 Ale. 95 ; in New H1ampshire, see
Hooksett v. Concord Railroad Co., 38 N.
H. 242 ; in Massachusetts, see Ingersoll
v. Stockbridge, 4-c., Railroad Co., 8
Allen (Mass.) 438. Yet in the absence
of any such statutory liability, a railroad company, authorized by its charter
to use steam power, has necessarily
granted, by implication, the right to
use the usual and only methods of generating steam ; that is, by fire, whether
of wood, coal, or other combustible,
and is not liable in damages for injuries
unavoidably caused by the use of fire
used in the generation of steam : Burlington, 4-c., Railroad Co. v. Wlestover, 4
Neb. 268 ; Vaughan v. Taff Vale Railroad Co., 5 Hurl. & Norm. 679 ; Freemantle v. London 4. Liverpool Railroad,
10 C. B. (N. S.) 89. Yet these cases
proceed upon the principle that the escape of the fire must be an unforeseen
and unavoidable casualty. But in such
cases the question of unavoidability is
one of fact, to be determined by the
jury from all the circumstances; and
where a party seeks to recover damages
caused by the escape of fire from a railroad company's engines, the burden of
proof is upon the party charging negligence to show negligence in the company ; for negligence will not be presumed against the company from the
mere fact of the injury. Thus in the
ease of McCready v. South Carolina
Railroad Co., 2 Strob. (S. C.) 356, it
was held that where the injury complained of was caused by the employees
of the company emptying coals from the
4aigine upon defendant's track, on trial

this act was shown to be necessary, and
that it was carefully done; court held
that plaintiff, under circumstances, as
proven, was not entitled to recover.

But in the case of Webb v. RailroadCo.,
3 Lansing 453,where the coals were negligently dropped from defendant's locomotive, set fire to the ties under its track,
and from the track it spread to plaintiffs
woodland, and burned the wood to
large extent and damaged the soil,
plaintiff was held entitled to recover.
In a late case in the Supreme Court of
the United States, that of Grand Trunk
Railroad Co. v. Richardson, I Otto 454,
it was held that whether the destruction
of property caused by fire escaped from
a locomotive was the result of negligence on part of a railroad company,
depends upon the facts shown as to
whether or not it used the caution and
diligence that the circumstances of the
case demanded, or prudent persons ordinarily exercise, and not upon the
usual conduct of other companies in the
vicinity. See also Troxler v. Riclanond,
4-c., Railroad Co., 74 N. C. 379.
The statutes of several states which
have heretofore been adverted to are
identical, substantially; they usually, in
substance, provide that the railway shall
be liable for all damages by fire that is
set or caused by operating such railway,
and such damage may be recovered by
the party damaged in the same manner
as the remedy providing for the recovery
of the value of stock.
Now the question arises, in case of
these remote fires, is the corporation absolutely liable for damages caused by
the escape of fire from its locomotives,
whether it is guilty of negligence or
not? It has been contended by able
jurists, that, in such cases, there can be
no recovery, unless upon proof of negligence on part of the defendant. They
base their position on this argument,
viz., this clause fixing the liability of
the corporation, is usually in the same
chapter with, and frequently forms one
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section, together with those clauses fixing the liability for the destruction of
stock, and they contend that a railroad
company is liable for the destruction of
stock on account of its negligence in
not fencing its track ; that the very fact
of the absence of a fence, by itself, constitutes negligence, and, consequently,
in case of fire, there can be no recovery
against the company unless some negligent act can be proven or inferred.
They conclude, from this, that as the
cases contemplated in the section, or
that part of the section relating to the
destruction of stock, depend for a recovery on the proof of negligence, those
for damages in case of fire must be dependent on proof of the same fact, and
that damages in the latter case are recoverable by the language of the section
in the same manner as the first.
Now, then, admitting it to be true that
in an action for the recovery of the
value of stock killed, the proof of negligence must be made to entitle plaintiff to recover ; the assumption is, that,
the negligence for the injuries to the
stock, consists in the failure to fence.
In the absence of a fence, the stock are
permitted to go upon the track ; the negliger.ce consists in the omission to fence.
Now why is not the same negligence
found in the act of permitting the escape of fire? Injury results in its escape.
Why could not the corporation prevent
it
But it might be urged that the fire
might escape through accident. But
this should not excuse the corporation
any more than running through the corporate limits of a town, through oversight or mistake, at a forbidden rate of
speed, would excuse the killing of
stock, while running at such rate of
speed. The acts of permission in these
two cases are of the same character;
that is, in permitting stock to run on
the track, by which permission the stock
is injured ; the permission of fire to escape by which property is destroyed.
It may be contended that the company

221

cannot dispense with the use of fire, it
being necessary in the running of engines, and when in use, especially in
the engines, liable to accidentally escape, and cannot be controlled with
absolute certainty. But the law holds
the escape of the fire to be per se negligence. It cannot admit of any such
conclusion as an unavoidable and unforeseen escape of the fire. Contrivances may be applied to locomotives
which would as effectually prevent the
escape of sparks and coals as a good
fence would prevent cattle from going
upon a railroad track.
The argument may be more successfully refuted by denying the premises on
which it is laid. The statute imposing
liabilities on railroad corporations for
stock killed by negligence of the company, does not require fences to be
built. The right of action for damages
for stock injured, depends on the negligence of the company in not building a
fence. These statutes simply create a
liability for damages caused by the killing of cattle where no fences are built;
for there is no violation of the statute
in an omission to fence ; there are no
rights involved therein, and the companies, if they refuse to fence their
track, do no more than exercise a right,
which the statute under consideration in
no wise abridges or abrogates. When
the law does not forbid an act, and
when it is done in the exercise of a
right, how can it be said to be negligence, especially when the doing of the
act does not conflict with the rights of
any one else ?
As to the liability created by such a"
statute; at points along its line where it
has the right to fence, and no fence is
erected, a railroad corporation would be
liable for stock killed. The statute applies to no other cases. Now, in regard
to the remedy, negligence need not be
shown ; the'proof of the injury or destruction of the property, by the owner,
will entitle him to a recovery. Now it
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naturally follows as a consequence of
all this, that the right to fence, and the
fact whether or not there is a fence at
all, has no reference, whatever, to care
or negligence. But in any one of the
sections or clauses of the section of the
statutes now under consideration, thereis
no condition accompanyingtheact of setting on fire necessary in order to create
liability. It is absolute and unconditional, and dependent on no facts or cir-

cumstances; it is simply dependent on
the fire alone. The provision does not
relate to the liability, but only to the
remedy. Whatever pertains to the
remedy in the other 6ections, or to the
remedial part of the same section, is referred to in this, and nothing else. From
this it will readily be seen that no idea
of negligence enters into the provision
creating liability on account of fire.
C. M. DuxiicA.

Court of Apveals of Kentucky.
SAWYER ET AL. v. TAGGART.
An executory contract for the sale of chattels, to be delivered in the future is valid
although the seller does not have them, nor any means of getting them at the date
of the contract.
But an understanding betiveen both the vendor and the purchaser, when the
contract is made, that the property shall not be delivered, but that the one will pay,
and the other receive the difference between the contract and the market price at the
maturity of the contract renders the transaction a mere wager and illegal.
If however either party contracts in good faith, a subsequent agreement that the
property may be re-sold before the time of delivery arrives, or that the contract shall
be settled by an adjustment and payment of differences, will not affect the validity
of the original contract.
A party ordering a re-sale of property before the contract time for delivery arrives will be liable for all losses thereby sustained.
The delivery of a warehouse receipt for a given number of barrels of pork, which
is only a parcel of a larger lot stored together, where there is nothing to indicate
the specific barrels embraced in the receipt, will not create a lien in favor of the
holder of the receipt.

THis was an action by Taggart, the appellee, to settle and
enforce a trust as assignee for the benefit of creditors of Hamilton

& Co.
The facts as they appeared in the answer and proofs were as
follows: Hainilton & Co., who were commission merchants in
Louisville, had from time to time, commencing in December 1875,
directed Sawyer & Co. (appellants), who were commission merchants and members of the Cotton and Produce Exchanges of New

York, to buy for them in New York, for future delivery, certain
specified quantities of cotton, pork and lard. Purchases were made
as directed, and Hamilton & Co. were notified of the act. The

rules of the exchanges where the cotton, pork and lard were pur
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chased, required all such contracts to be made in the names of
members of those exchanges, respectively, and Hamilton & Co.
not being members, the contracts were made in the name of Sawyer
& Co. as buyers. When the time for the delivery of each successive purchase was near at hand, Sawyer & Co. were directed to
"transfer" it to a subsequent month. A direction to "transfer" a
purchase deliverable in one month to a subsequent month, as defined
by the evidence, amounted to a direction to resell the commodity,
and purchase a like quantity, deliverable in the month indicated.
The contracts for cotton were expressed to be made "in view of,
and in all respects subject to the rules and conditions established
by the New York Cotton Exchange, and subject to, and in all respects in accordance with art. xviii of the by-laws," and these for
pork and lard "in view of, and in all respects subject to the bylaws and rules of the New York Produce Exchange," in force at
the date of the contracts respectively.
Under these rules, contracts for future delivery designate the
month within which delivery shall be made, and the time of delivery
within the month is at the seller's option, on five days' notice for
cotton, and three days' notice for pork and lard. A buyer holding
such a contract, and desiring to "transfer" it to some future month,
offers the commodity contracted for, for sale on the exchange, and
transfers his contract to the purchaser, who, by the rules of the
exchange, becomes bound to receive the property from the original
seller and pay for it at the original contract price, and if the prices
he agrees to pay his immediate vendor be less than the latter agreed
to pay the original seller, then the .party reselling pays the difference to his vendee. The contracts made by Sawyer & Co. for
Hamilton & Co., being in the name of the former, when in making
"transfers" they sold at less than they had agreed to pay, they
wtre required to and did pay to tlfe purchaser from them the difference. For the money thus paid by them, and for brokerage and
otber expenss. tbhey claimed to be allowed as creditors of Hamilton
& Cu. in the settlement of appellee's account as assignee, the
court below rejected the claim, whereupon Sawyer & Co. appealed
to this court.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
COFER, J.-The ground upon which the claim of appellants was
resisted by the appellees and rejected by the court was, that the
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purchases of cotton, pork and lard were not made in good faith,
with an intention that the commodities bought should be delivered
and paid for according to the tenor of the contracts, but that it was
understood by both Sawyer & Co. and Hamilton and Co., and those
with whom contracts of purchases were made, that the commodities
purporting to be bought and sold, would not be delivered or paid for,
but that in lieu of delivery and payment, the contracts were to be settled by the payment by one party and receipt by the other, of the differences between the contract and the market price on the days when
by the terms of the contracts they were to have been performed.
All the purchases were for delivery at a future date, and there
is nothing in the record to show that the several vendors at the
time of making sales, had in possession or had contracted for the
goods they agreed to sell, or that they had any means of getting
them, except by purchasing in the market. This, however, cannot
constitute any valid objection to the contracts, for it is now well
settled by the authorities, both in this country and in England, that
executory contracts for the sale of goods for future delivery may
be valid, although the seller has them not at the date of the contract, and has no means of getting them except by subsequent
purchases. Whitehead v. Boot, 2 Met. 587; Hibblewhite v. MeMorine, 5 M. & W. 462; Grizewood v. Blaine, 11 0. B. 526;
Brown v. Speyer, 20 Gratt. 309; Stanton v. Small, 8 Sandford
230; S7ith v. Bouvier, 70 Penn. St. 330.
Nor do we understand learned counsel for the appellee to controvert this; but they claim that the contracts were illegal solely
on the ground that there was rio intention upon the part of either
seller or purchaser to deal in the goods contracted for, and that it
was understood between them that the contracts were not to be
performed by delivery and payment, but were to be settled by the
payment of differences.
Counsel for the appellants concede that such contracts, however
formal and regular on their face, are mere wagers, and that if the
laws of the state of New York declare wagering contracts void,
then these contracts are void if they axe of the character claimed
by the counsel for appellee; but they deny that there is sufficient
evidence that they are of that character, and they also claim that,
as there is no evidence in the record that the statutes of New York
forbid the making of wagering contracts, and as the courts of this
state cannot take judicial notice of the statutes of another state,
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we must presume the common law to be in force in New York, and
that, as wagers are valid at the common law, we must hold the contracts in question, even if mere wagers, to be valid by the laws
where made, and therefore as not invalid here.
But waiving the question as to the validity at the common law
of mere wagers on the market price of good which constitute
leading articles of commerce and are prime necessaries of life, and
assuming for the purposes of this case, that such contracts are prohibited by the statutes of New York, we proceed to the inquiry
whether these contracts were mere wagers. But before examining
the evidence relied upon to establish the illegal character of the
contracts, we will first ascertain the distinction between wagers on
the market price and valid speculative contracts.
"re have already seen that an understanding between the vendor
and purchaser, that the goods shall not be delivered, but the one
will pay and the other will receive the difference between the contract price and the market price on the day of the maturity of the
contract, renders the transaction a mere wager. But such must be
the understanding of both parties. "The intention of the parties
gives character to the transaction, and if either party contracted in
good faith, he is entitled to the benefit of his contract, no matter
what may have been the secret purpose and intention of the other :"

Pixley v. Boynton, 79 Ill. 353.
So also it is well settled that the fact that the purchaser may
have intended not to receive the goods, but to resell them before
the time for delivery, and even though the seller knew that such
was his intention, the transaction will not be deemed gambling.

Ashton v. IDaken 4 H. & N 867, is a strong case in support
of this conclusion. There the plaintiff bought stock for the
defendant. "The defendant never in fact at any time intended
.to take a transfer or call on the plaintiff to deliver the stock. The
plaintiff was fflfly aware of this when the orders were given, and
they were accepted on the implied terms and understanding that
the plaintiff should not be called upon by the defendant to deliver
the stock * * * and that the defendant should not be called
on to pay for the same * * * but that they should be resold
by the plaintiff for the defendant before the time of payment arrived;
and the defendant should, on the resale, either pay or receive the
difference, after debiting him with the plaintiff's charges on the purchase and resale." This was held clearly not a gambling transaction. Seealsotothesame effect, Smith v. Bouvier,70 Penn. St. 330,
VOL. XXVIT.-29
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The conclusion reached in these cases seems to us to be rational
and just. What valid objection can exist to such transactions? As
we have already seen by the terms of the contracts and rules of the
exchanges, when there is a resale of goods bought for future delivery
the sub-purchaser becomes bound to receive and pay for the goods.
The original contract is thus kept in force aud ultimately to be performed, and the intention of the original purchaser to resell before
the date for delivery, even if known to the seller, does not render
the transaction fictitious. It cannot be material whether the contract is finally performed by the original parties or by others whom
they have procured to perform it in their stead.
It seems to us, therefore, that the correct rule is this: When the
contract, on'its face, and according to the customs of the trade,
with reference to which it may be shown to have been made, is capable of being enforced by either party against the other, it is a
lawful contract, unless at the time of entering into it there was
an agreement or understanding between the parties that it should
not be performed according to its tenor, either by them or others,
to be procured by them; but if the understanding and intention of
both parties at the time of making the contract was that they were
neither to perform it themselves nor to procure others to perform it
for them, or if by thqli.'ke understanding either party may elect
before the time of performance, not to perform his part, and discharge himself by th'payment of the difference between the contract price and the market price at time of exercising his option,
or at the maturity of the contract, the transaction is a mere wager.
Testing the case at bar by this nile, we think there will not be
much difficulty in reaching a satisfactory conclusion.
The evidence establishes, we think, with absolute certainty, that
Hamilton & Co. did not intend to receive the goods they purchased,
but intended to resell them before the day of delivery, and from
the correspondence between the parties, their previous dealings and
other circumstances in evidence, we are equally well satisfied that
Sawyer & Co. knew such was their intention and acquiesced in it.
But we have seen that if the purchases in question had been made
by Hamilton & Co., directly from Sawyer & Co., with the understanding between them which we have seen existed, the contracts
would not have been invalid, because of the intention, known to
both parties, not to receive but to resell the goods. It will, however, be borne in mind, tbat Sawyer & Co. made no sales-to
Hamilton & Co.; that the relation between them was that of prin-
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cipal and agent, and not that of buyer and seller. Sawyer & Co.
were the ostensible buyers, and the validity of the contracts made
by them, must be tested by the agreements and understanding
between them and those from whom they bought, and cannot be in
any way affected by the understanding between them and their
principal. There is no direct evidence conducing in any degree
whatever, to show that there was any understanding or agreement
respecting these transactions between the parties to them, except
such as are expressed in written memorials and the rules of the
exchanges and the usages of trade in New York.
Counsel for appellees contend, however, that the rules of the exchanges and the. customs of trade are sufficient to show that the
parties to these contracts never intended they should be performed
except by the payment of differences, and that either of the parties
might have elected at any time to cancel the contracts by paying
the difference between the contract price and the market price, at
the time of such election. The evidence shows that nearly all the
sales in New York of cotton, pork and lard, for future delivery, are
made on 'change, upon contracts in all respects precisely like those
in question, and if these were illegal then all are illegal. The evidence also shows, that producers and dealers sell, and exporters,
manufacturers and dealers buy on 'change, to a very large extent.
This is wholly inconsistent with the idea that all such contracts are
mere wagers, and that none of them are enforceable, and of itself
furnishes strong reason for suspecting that counsel are mistaken in
the conclusion they have reached, that these contracts are mere
illegal wagers.
There is, no doubt, much most iniquitous and pernicious gambling in the city of New York, and indeed in all the large cities
in this counlry, on the prices of all the leading articles of commerce; but hat all the contracts made upon two of the principal
exchanges oi the commercial metropolis of the country are of that
character, is not to be credited without the most convincing evidence.
Counsel claim that the evidence shows that a very large per cent.
of the contracts for future deliveries are settled by the payment of
differences. This is no doubt true, but does not warrant the conclusion that all such contracts are made with the intention on the
part of both buyer and seller that they shall be so settled; and unless such intention and understanding exist at the time of entering
into the contract, the subsequent agreement and actual settlement
in that way does not affect the validity of the original contract.

SAWYER v. TAGGART.

That the parties to a contract may lawfully cancel it on such
terms as they may agree on will not be questioned, and the only
effect the fact that many contracts for future deliveries are so cancelled can have in this case, is as evidence conducing to prove that
these contracts were made on an understanding and agreement that
they should be so settled. But giving to this fact all the weight to
which it is entitled, it falls far short of establishing the alleged vice
in the contract in qcuestion against the direct and positive testimony
of all the parties to them who have been introduced as witnesses,
and against the further fact already adverted to, that large quantities of cotton and pork and lard are constantly being delivered and
paid for under similar contracts.
Nor do we find anything in the rules of the exchanges made
part of the contracts warranting the conclusion that there was an
agreement for a mere payment of differences, or that either party
had the option without such agreement to cancel the contracts by
paying or demanding the payment of differences.
Rule 4 of the Cotton Exchange provides that "either party to a
contract may close or cancel the same by giving notice in writing
to the opposite party any day before notice of delivery has been
given." But the rule goes on to provide that "the party to whom
notice is given has the option either to make settlement (which the
evidence shows means to pay or receive the difference), or to
receive a satisfactory contract made equal to that held by him."
The party giving the notice has a right to cancel his contract by an
adjustment of the difference only in the event the other party
agrees to accept that mode of settlement; but if the other party
choose, he may demand another contract in all respects equal to
that to be cancelled, and unless such contract be furnished, he may
hold on to the one he already has and enforce it.
The same rule also provides for cancelling contracts in other cases,
but these provisions have no application to this case.
Counsel for the appellee cite Saunders v. Shaw, 101 Mass. 145;
Cassardv. Hinman, 1 Bos. 201; Brua's Appeal, 55 Penn. St.
296; Kirkpatrick v. Bonsall, 72 Penn. St. 155;- Armory v.
G-ilman, 2 Mass.; Lyon v. Cuberton,83 Ill. 34, and some other
cases in support of their position in regard to these contracts. It
would extend this opinion too much to discuss all these cases, but
they have been carefully read and considered, and none of them
are regarded as in conflict with the conclusion we have reached.
They all decide that wagering contracts are void, but they do not
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any of them define a wagering contract materially different from
the way in which we have defined it. The difference, and only
material difference, between those cases and this is the conclusion
reached as to the character of the contracts in question, and not as
to the rule applicable to them when their character is ascertained.
The contracts made by Sawyer & Co. having been entered into
by them for and under the direction of Hamilton & Co., and being
valid and enforceable against Sawyer & Co., they were bound when
they resold, to pay the losses sustained. When the resales were
ordered by Hamilton & Co., the prices had declined below the contract prices, and this fact must have been known to them, and they
also evidently knew that the difference must be met, and their
directions to resell were equivalent to requests to pay these differ.
ences, and the law would imply a promise to reimburse them, and,
beside this, Hamilton & Co. actually so promised and paid a part
and gave their negotiable securities for another portion, and, as is
evident from the record, were only prevented from paying the
whole, by their failure in business.
We are, therefore, of the opinion, that for all the money paid by
them in adjusting the losses on resales, and for brokerage and other
proper expenses of these transactions, they are entitled to share
equally with the other creditors of Hamilton & Co. But they are
not entitled to any preference on account of the warehouse receipt
delivered to them as security for those advances. It is for 1000
barrels of mess pork, which the evidence shows was a part of a
much larger quantity similarly branded and stored together, and
there is nothing in or on the receipt to indicate the particular barrels embraced by it, or to distinguish them from the residue of the
lot. Such a receipt created no lien: May v. ffoagZand, 9 Bush
172; Brown v. Ukild8, 2 Duv. 315.
Judgmer.t reversed and cause remanded for judgment in conformity to this opinion.
A large amount of litigation has arisen
in this country out of questions concerning the effect and validity of contracts
for the sale and future delivery of personal property. It may subserve therefore a useful purpose to call attention to
the later cases elucidating the doctrine of
the principal case, and pointing out the
distinctions which have now become es-

tablished by the adjudged cases. Much
discussion has ensued upon the question
whether time 4ales or option sales, of
chattels, are not wagering contracts,
and therefore illegal. And many of the
cases do not clearly recognise the distinctions .upon which the validity of
such contracts depend.
An option sale is valid where the only
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option given is, that the seller may deliver any time he chooses, between certain dates agreed upon: Logan v. Musick,
81 111.415; Wolcott v. Heath, 78 Id. 433.
But a sale, where the option is that the
seller may deliver the property, or never
deliver it, just as he may choose, is
in general, invalid. Of this class are
what are called "puts" and "calls."
A "-put" is a privilege given for a
nominal consideration of delivering, or
not delivering, as the purchaser may
elect, of a quantity of grain, or other
commodity, within a certain time, at a
specified price; the party giving the
privilege, agreeing that if delivery be
made within the specified time he will
take it and pay for it at the price named.
And a "call" is a privilege on the part
of the purchaser of it, of calling or
not calling for the delivery of the
commodity with reference to which
the contract is made: Ex parte Young,
6 Bissell 53; Piley v. Boynton, 79 Ills.
533; In re C'handler, 13 Am. Law Reg.
N. S. 310. The interest of the holder
of the " put" always is to break down
the price of the commodity, and that of
the seller to maintain the price ; while
in the case of a "1call" the interest
of the seller and of the purchaser is
reversed. In either of these cases large
transactions may be nominally had without any actual transfer of property,
and in the case of the great staples of
the world, like grain, provisions and
cotton, may produce great fluctuations
in prices, to the serious detriment of legitimate trading, and of the proper distribution of these *commodities, among
the masses who either manufacture or
consume them. Hence it is on the
ground of public policy that such contracts are held void by the common law,
as being mere betting upon prices.
There is another class of contracts
which are regular upon their face, hut
which have been held invalid, from the
circumstance that at the time they were
made, it was the intention and under-

standing of the parties that the property
should not be delivered, but that the
difference between the market price on
the day of delivery, and that stipulated
in the contract should be paid by one of
the parties to the other, according as
such market price might exceed or fall
short of that stipulated. The principal case asserts this doctrine. Erua's
Appeal, 55 Penn. St. 298; Cossard v.
Hinman, 1 Bosworth (N. Y.) 207;
Lyon v. Culbertson, 83 Ills. 38; Pickering v. Cease, 79 Ills. Rep. 238; Tenney
v. Foote, 11 Chicago Legal News 71.
The principal case also properly notes
the limitation of this doctrine, which is,
that if the purchaser of the commodity
in good faith intends to receive it, it is
not an illegal or gambling contract, no
matter what may have been the secret
intention of the seller: Pixley v. Boynton, supra; Lehman v. Strassberger, 2
Wood's Cir. Ct. Rep. 557 ; Clark,
Assignee, v. Foss, 10 Chicago Legal
News 211.
The doctrine of the principal case is
generally recognised, that a contract for
the sale of goods to be delivered at a
future day is not invalidated by the
circumstance that at the time of the
contract the vendor neither has the
goods in his possession, norhas entered
into any contract to buy them, nor has
any reasonable expectation of becoming
possessed of them by the time appointed
for delivering them, otherwise than by
purchasing them after making the contract: Ex parte Young, supra; Clark,
Assignee, v. Foss, supra; Porterv. Viets,
1 Bissell 177; AMcllvane v. Egerton,
2 Robertson 422 ; Sanborn v. Benedict,
78 Ills. Rep. 309 ; Logan v. Musick,
supra, and cases cited in principal case.
In many cases parties at a distance
have employed brokers to make time
sales and purchases of commodities at
the centres of trade, and losses have
occurred, and the question has arisen
whether such brokers were entitled to
recover from their principals for such
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losses. Upon this point the doctrine of
both the English and American cases is,
that if an agent advances money for his
principal, though it be to pay losses
incurred in an illegal transaction, and
he thereafter executes his note, or promises to reimburse his principal, or if
knowing the facts, he fails to repudiate,
or object to the proceedigs until the
transaction is closed, he will be bound
to his agent for whatever loss the latter
may have sustained. Fail'neyv. Reynon.,
4 Burrow 2067: Petre v. Hannay, 3
Term R. 418; Tenant v. Elliott, I Bos.
& Pul. 3 ; Owen v. Daris, 1 Bailey S.
C. 315; Armstrongv. Toler, 11 Wheaton
274; Ramsey v. Berry, 65 Maine 570,
.Durantv. Bart, 98 Mass. 161 ; Knight
v. Cambers, 15 C. B. 563, (80 Eng.
Com. Law 561); Jessopp v. Lutwyche,
10 Exch. 617 ; Rosewarner v. Billing,
15 C. B. N. S. 316, (109 Eng. Corn.
Law 316). In the last cited case plaintiff declared for money paid for the
defendant at his request. Defendant
pleaded inter elia that plaintiff was a
mining share agent, and that after the
passage pf the statute 8 & 9 Vict. ch.
109, he had contracted for defendant
with certain persons concerning mining
shares, agreeing that if the value of the
shares should be lower on a future day
named than at the date of the wagering
contract, defendant should receive from
such persons the difference, and vice
versa; that it was never intended that
any shares should be bought or sold, as
plaintiff well knew, but that differences
only should be received or paid; that the
money paid by plaintiff was paid in
settling and discharging differences in
such wagering contracts, which were
made by plaintiff in his own name, as
was the custom among mining share
agents, without disclosing the name of
defendant. Plaintiff demurred to the
plea and the demurrer was sustained.
ERLE, C. J., says : " Here the plaintiff
paid the differences according to the
result, and at the defendant's request,

I am clearly of the opinion, that, if a
man loses a wager, and gets another to
pay the money for him, an action lies
for the recovery of the money so paid.
In Jessopp v. Lutwyche and Knight v.
Cambers, the Court of Exchequer and
this court both- say that the plaintiff
was entitled to judgment on the ground
that the money was alleged to have been
paid at the request of the defendant, and
that there was nothing to show that
there was any illegality. These cases
are in point to show this to be a bad
plea. I should incline to think, that,
if one requests another to make a wagering contract on his account, and pay
the loss, if loss happens, that would be
a continuing request to pay until revoked. If the party were a broker, who
by the usage of the share-market was
bound in all events to pay, it might be
a question whether the principal could
be allowed to rescind."
In Lehman v. Stra.sberger, Lehman
Bros., cotton factors in New York, were
employed by Strassberger, a resident of
Alabama, to buy and sell cotton for
him for future delivery, with the understanding, that there was to be no
delivery, but that differences were to
be paid, unless there were special instructions to the contrary that Lehman
Bros., in accordance with the rules of
the cotton exchange, made contracts for
cotton with other parties not disclosed,
which resulted in losses that Lehman
Bros. paid, and thereafter Strassberger
executed his note to them for the amount
thereof; ldd, Strassberger was liable for
such losses; that the court was not called
upon to enforce a contract which might
have been illegal, as a wagering contract
between Lehman Bros., and those with
whom they botght or sold cotton, but
simply enforcing the collection of A
note, the consideration of which was
money advanced and services performed
by agents "for their principal : Lehman
Bros. v. Strassberger,2 Wood's Cir. Ct
562.
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Again, a party conversant with the
rules and usages of an organization
like the Board of Trade in Chicago,
who buys or sells thereon through a
commission merchant, for future delivery, will be bound by the usages of
such board. And in such case, if a
commission merchant purchase grain on
the market for his customer, the latter
putting up margins, knowing that he
was required to keep the same good, in
case of a decline in the market, then if
he fail to do so, after reasonable notice
to him, the merchant will have the right
to sell on the market and charge the losses
to the purchaser: Carbett v. Underwood,
83 Ills. 324.
Contracts of sale for future delivery
may be legitimate upon their face and
yet they may be shown by extraneous
In a case in
evidence to be illegal.
Pennsylvania the contract was, that
"in consideration of $1000, the defendants, Nov. 10, 1870, agreed to deliver
to plaintiff 5000 barrels of oil, at any
time within the first six months of 1871.
If this oil is called for, this call becomes
a contract; ten days' notice shall be
given, and (the plaintiff) or his assigns
agree to receive and pay for the same,
cash on delivery, at 10- cents pergallon,
etc." Held, not to be on its fabe a gambling contract, but that its character
might be weighed in connection with
other evidence on the question whether
the transaction was a gambling scheme;
Kirkpatrick v. Bonsall, 72 Penn. St.
155.
Much legislation has been enacted prohibiting wagering or gambling contracts.
The disasters reshlting from speculation
in stocks in connection with Law's South
Sea Bubble led to the enactment of the
statute of 7 Geo. 2, ch. 8, in 1734.
It declared absolutely void all contracts
upon which any premium should be
given "for liberty to put upon, or to

deliver, receive, accept or refuse any
public or joint stock, or other public
securities whatsoever, or any part, share
or interest therein, and also all wagers and contracts in the nature of
wagers, and all contracts in the nature
of puts and refusals relating to the then
present or future price or value of any
such stock or securities." It fixed a
penalty of 5001., for the making of
such contracts, and also prohibited under penalty of 1001. the payment or
receipt of money " for the compounding,
satisfying, or making up of any difference for the not delivering, transferring,
having or receiving any public or joint
stock, or other public securities, or for
the not performing of any contract or
agreement, so stipulated and agreed to
be performed."
Other statutes have been passed in
England and in the leading American
states having the same general object,
and with more or less stringent provisions, and some of them enacted to
control wagering contracts in specific
commodities. But it is believed that
these statutes in this country for the
most part only prohibit speculation in
prices where the property itself is meither
transferred nor intended to be, but only
the privilege given to buy or to sell in
the future, to be exercised, or not to
be exercised, to be enforced, or not to
be enforced, as the buyer or seller may
elect. So far as I have observed none
of these statutes have been construed
so as to overturn a legitimate time eontract for the sale and future delivery of
property, and it may well be doubted
-whether they could be so interpreted
without infringing upon that clause of
the Federal constitution which prohibits
state legislation of such a character as
will impair the obligation of contracts.
C. H. W.
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While the principal or teacher in charge of a public school is subordinate to the
school board or board of education of his district or city, and must enforce rules
and regulations adopted by the board for the government of the school, and execute all its lawful orders in that behalf, he does not derive all his power and
autnority in the school and over his pupils from the affirmative action of the board.
He stands in loco parentis to his pupils, and because of that relation he has authority, where the board has remained silent, to enforce obedience to his lawful commands, subordination, civil deportment, respect for the rights of other pupils and
fidelity to duty, which are obligations inherent in any proper school system, and
constitute the common law of the school, which every pupil is presumed to know
and is subject to, whether it has or has not been re-enacted by the district board
in the form of written rules and regulations.
The teacher has, thereibre, in a proper case, the inherent power to suspend a
pupil from the privileges of his school, unless he has been deprived of the power by
the affirmative action of the proper board.
The decisions of the department of public instruction on questions within its jurisdiction are entitled to great weight, and should never be overruled by the courts,
unless clearly contrary to law.
As to whether a writ of mandana can issue in any case to the teacher in charge
nf a public school to compel haim of reinstate a suspended pupil, queere.

APPEAL from Circuit Court of Rock county. On mandamus.
The relator is a resident of the city of Janesville, and the

defendant is the principal in charge of the High School in that
city.
The relator presented his affidavit to the Circuit Court, in which
he charged, in substance, that on the 13th of December 1877, the
defendant, without lawful authority or right, and without legal or
reasonable excuse, and contrary to the known wishes of the relator,

suspended and expelled from said school the relator's son George,
aged about sixteen years, who had theretofore been a pupil therein;
that the defendant has refused and still does refuse to admit the

said George as a pupil in the school.
To the writ the defendant made return, in which he set forth that
he suspended George from the privileges of the school for continued

misconduct, persisted in by him after patient,. kind and friendly
advice by his teachers to abstain therefrom, to the injury and
demoralization of his class and other pupils in the school. The
return contained numerous specifications of disobedient and dis-

,grderly conduct, unnecessary to state in detail.
to set forthVOL. XXVII.-30

It then proceeded
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"That his suspension from the privileges of the said High
School was reported to the Board of Education, which approved,
ratified, and sanctioned the same, and ordered said suspension continued.
"That on the same day of said suspension, this defendant did
also give immediate notice of such suspension to Austin E. Burpee,
father of the said suspended pupil, specifying the name of the
suspended pupil, the character and date of the offences for which
he was suspended, the date of suspension, and other relevant
information in relation to such suspension." * * * *
"And this defendant avers, upon information and belief, that
when the said George L. Burpee manifests and expresses regret for
his aforesaid misconduct and behavior as a pupil of said High School,
and makes a sincere promise of future good conduct, and by complying with the reasonable rules adopted by said Board of Educ.tion, he can be re-admitted as a pupil in said High School; and this
defendant, as teacher and superintendent of the same, will on such
terms be glad to have him re-admitted as a pupil in said High
School."
The relator demurred to the return for insufficiency is not stating
facts sufficient to show that the relator is not entitled to the peremptory writ prayed for.
Also, that said return is defective and insufficient in not setting
forth the rules therein referred to, and in not stating the time
'when said rules were violated, and how and wherein violated, and
also in not stating that said several rules were and each was known
to said George L. Burpee, before the alleged violation of the same.
Also, that it does not appear by said return or answer that the
expulsion of said Burpee was at all necessary to the good order and
government of said school.
The court sustained the demurrer and ordered a peremptory
mandamus .o issue. The defendant thereupon appealed to this
court.
Bennett . Sale, for appellant.
Winan8 "MeElroy, for tppellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LYoN, J.-The power of the Board of Education to suspend a
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pupil from the privileges of the school under its charge, and even

to expel him, for persistent misconduct, is freely conceded by the
learned counsel for the relator. That the acts of misconduct
charged against the relator's son in the defendant's return to the
alternative writ of mandamus, furnished sufficient grounds for suspending him, we cannot doubt. And moreover, if he was lawfully
suspended, no sufficient grounds for restoration are stated in the
affidavit for the writ. Indeed the return shows affirmatively that
he has not placed himself in a position to entitle him to restoration.
On the argument of the appeal, counsel informed us that the
learned circuit judge held that the defendant has no power to
suspend a pupil for any cause, such power being vested by law
exclusively in the Board of Education, and that the demurrer to the
return was sustained on that ground.
Whether the defendant has such power of suspension, and if so,
whether it was properly exercised in the present case, are the controlling questions to be determined on this appeal.
While the principal or teacher in charge of a public school is
subordinate to the school board or board of education of his district
or city, and must enforce rules and regulations adopted by the
board for the government of the school, and execute all its lawful
orders in.that behalf, he does not derive all his power and authority
in the school and over his pupils from the affirmative action of the
board. He stands for the time being in loco parentiR to his pupils,
and because of that relation he must necessarily exercise authority'
over them in many things concerning which the board may have
remained silent. In the school, as in the fanuily, there exists on
the part of the pupils the obligations of obedience to lawful commands, subordination, civil deportment, respect for the rights of
other pupils and fidelity to duty. These obligations are inherent
in any proper school system, and constitute, so to speak, the common law of the school. Every pupil is presumed to know this law
and is subject to it, whether it has or has not been re-enacted by
the district board in the form of written rules and regulations.
Indeed it would seem impossible to frame rules which would cover
all cases of insubordination and all acts of vicious tendency which
the teacher is liable to encounter daily and hourly.
The teacher is responsible for the discipline of his school, and
for the progress, conduct and deportment of his pupils. It is his
imperative duty to maintain good order and to require of his pupils
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a faithful performance of their duties. If he fails to do so he is
unfit for his position. To enable him to discharge these duties
effectually, he must necessarily have the power to enforce prompt
obedience to his lawful commands. For this reason the law gives
him the power, in proper cases, to inflict corporal punishment upon
refractory pupils. But there are cases of misconduct for which
such punishment is an inadequate remedy. If the offender is
incorrigible, suspension or expulsion is the only adequate remedy.
In general, no doubt, the teacher should report a case of that kind
to the proper board for its action in,'the first instance, if no delay
will necessarily result from that course prejudicial to the best
interests of the school. But the conduct of the recusant pupil
may be such that his presence in the school for a day or an hour
may be disastrous to the discipline of the school, and even to the
morals of the other pupils. In such a case it seems absolutely
essential to the welfare of the school that the teacher should have
the power to suspend the offender at once from the privileges of the
school; and he must necessarily decide for himself whether the
case requires that remedy. If he suspends the pupil, he should
promptly report his action and his reasons therefor, to the proper
board. It will seldom be necessary for the teacher in charge of a
district school to exercise this power, because usually he can communicate readily with the district board, and obtain the direction
and order of the board in the matter. But where the government
of a public school is vested in a board of education (as in the present
case), with a more numerous membership than district boards, and
which hold stated meetings for the transaction of business, the
facilities for speedy communication with the board may be greatly
decreased, and more time must Usually elapse before the board can
act upon a complaint of the teacher. In those schools the occasions
which require the action of the teacher in the first instance will
occur more frequently than in the district schools. We conclude,
therefore, that the teacher has, in a proper case, the inherent power
to. suspend a pupil from the privileges of his school, unless he has
been deprived of the power by the affirmative action of the proper
board.
In the present case we think that the acts of misconduct alleged
against the relator's son in the return to the alternative writ, were
of a character which justified the defendant in suspending him
temporarily, without the previous order of the board of education.
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Although, for the purposes of this appeal, the specifications of
misconduct contained in the return are admitted by the demurrer,
we abstain from setting them out here because it might be unjust
to the relator and his son to spread those specifications upon our
records before there has been an opportunity to controvert them.
It is believed that the conclusions we have reached in this case
are in accord with the uniform rulings of the department of public
instruction on kindred questions. The decisions by that department of questions within its jurisdiction are entitled to great weight,
and should never be overruled by the courts unless clearly contrary
to law.
Certain special grounds of demurrer are assigned, but we do not
deem it necessary to pass upon them. If any of them are well
assigned leave should have been given to amend the return in the
particulars wherein it is defective. Such leave would have been
given, doubtless, had the ruling of the Circuit Court been based
upon the special grounds assigned.
It follows from the foregoing views .that the Circuit Court erred
in sustaining the demurrer to the return.
We have grave doubts whether the writ of mandamus can issue
in any case to the teacher in charge of a public school to compel
him to reinstate a suspended pupil, but have. concluded to leave
that question undetermined on this appeal. We, however, suggest
to counsel for the relator, the questions whether, in case the averment in the return is true that the board of education has ratified.
and confirmed the act complained of, the whole matter has not
passed beyond the control of the defendant; and whether the writ
can now go to any person or body other than the board.
We may be permitted to add, in conclusion, that our system of
public schools necessarily involves the most delicate relations between
parents and children on one side, and the school authorities on the
other, and controversies must frequently arise growing out of the
enforcement of school discipline. These controversies, relating as
they usually do to the control, management and correction of pupils,
are apt to have their origin in wounded parental feelings; and are
frequently prosecuted with much bitterness. It is cause for congratulation that so few of these controversies appear in the courts.
Most of them are determined by the superintendent of public
instruction, whose decisions are almost invariably acquiesced in.
This result is due to the ability and good judgment of the gentle-
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men who have severally filled that high office for a long series of.
years, aided as we doubt not many of them have been, by the
valuable counsels of the present learned and able assistant superintendent, who has long served in that position greatly to the
benefit of the state. We regret that this unfortunate controversy
could not have been udjusted in the same manner.
The order of the Circuit Court is reversed and the cause remanded
for further proceedings according to law.
The number of cases touching upon
the powers and duties of school teachers
as respects the correction and restraint
of the pupils under their charge, is,
considering the great importance of the
interests involved, surprisingly small.
The English authorities, especially, are
very few; and all the American cases
to be found in the various series of reports, it is believed will bo found cited
in this note.
The authority of the teacher with respect to the correction of his pupils is
analogous to that which belongs to
parents, and is regarded as a delegation
of at least a portion of the parental
authority, and the presumptions are in
favor of the correctness of his action :
State v. Pendergrass, .2 ])ev. & Bat.
S65; Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114;
Commonwealth v. Seed, 5 Pa. Law Jour.
Rep. 78; Anderson v. The State, 3
Head455. See, also, Hathewayv. Bice,
19 Vt. 102, 108.
The old authorities and some modern
ones seem to place the authority of a
school teacher over the pupil, while it
exists, upon precisely the same footing
as that of a parent over his child : Fitzgerald v. Northcote, 4 Fost. & Fin. 656,
663, note, and cases cited, and 689,
per COcxBURN, C. J. The old authorities will be found cited in the note on
page 663. This has, however, been
questioned. Blackstone says : "The
master is in loco parends, and has such
a portion of the powers of the parent
committed to his charge, viz.: that of
restraint and correction, as may be ne-

cessary to answer the purposes for which
he is employed :" I Bl. Com. 453. See
also Chitty's note. And in Lander v.
Sewver, supra, the court approve the above
rule, and very reasonably say: "The
parent, unquestionably, is answerable
only for malice or wicked motives, oran
evil heart in punishing his child. This
great, and to some extent, irresponsible
power of control and correction, is invested in the parent by nature and neces.
sity. It springs from the natural rela,
tion of parent and child. It is felt
rather as a duty than a power. * * *
This parental fower is little liable to
abuse, for it is continually restrained by
natural affection, the tenderness which
the parent feels for his offspring, an
affection ever on the alert, and acting
rather by instinct than reasoning. The
schoolmaster has no such natural restraint. Hence he may not safely be
trusted with all a parent's authority, for
he does not act from the instinct of
parental affection. He should be guided
and restrained by judgment and wise
discretion, and hence is responsible for
their reasonable exercise.2
This principle is further illustrated by
the cases of Morrow v. Wood, 13 Am.
Law Reg. (N. S.) 692 ; a. c. 35 Wis.
59, and Rulison v. Post, 79 Ill. 567.
In Morrow v. Wood, a father had directed his child, in attendance upon a public school, to pursue only certain studies,
selected by the father from those required or permitted by law to be taught
in such school, and actually taught
therein, and had forlbidden the child to
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pursue a certain other study, and this
fact was known to the teacher of the
school. It was held that such teacher
was not authorized to inflict corporal
punishment upon the child for the purpose of compelling it to pursue the
study so forbidden by the father. Neither
has the teacher, under the orders ofthe directors, power to expel a pupil from the
school under such circumstances for declining to pursue a certain study forbidden by the parent: .Rudison v. Post,
supra. See also, Dritt v. Snodgrass, 66
Mo. 286.
The authotities all concede the power
of the teacher, under proper circumstances, to inflict a reasonable corporal
punishment upon the pupil. This rule
of law has, however, been criticised,
and the tendency is to restrict rather
than enlarge the authority of the teacher
in this respect. In Cooper v. Mc.Tunkin,
4 Ind. 290 (1853), STUART, J., uses
the following language: "'The law still
tolerates corporal punishment in the
school-room. The authorities are all
that way, and the legislature has not
thought proper to interfere. The public
seems to cling to a despotism in the government of schools which has been discarded everywhere else. Whether such
training be congenial to our institutions and favorable to the full development of the future man, is worthy of
serious consideration, though not for us
to decide."
In that case, the reasonable rule was
laid down, that a teacher in the exercise
of the power of corporal punishment,
must not make such power a pretext for
cruelty and oppression ; but the cause
must be sufficient, the instrument suitable, and the manner and extent of the
correction, the part of the person to
which it is applied, and the temper in
which it is inflicted, should be distinguished with the kindness, prudence,
and propriety which becomes the station.
See also Quinn v. Nolans 4 Cin. Law
Bull. 81.

In State v. Pendergrass, 2 Der. &
Bat. 365, the rule, as to the extent of
punishment, is laid down as follows:" The welfare of the child is the main
purpose for which pain is permitted to
be inflicted. Any punishment therefore, which may seriously endanger life,
limbs or health, or shall disfigure the
child, or cause any other permanent injury, may be pronounced in itself immoderate, as not only being unnecessary for, but inconsistent with, the purpose for which correction is authorized.
But any correction, however severe,
which produces temporary pain only,
and no permanent ill, can not be so
pronounced, since it may have been
necessary for the reformation of the
child, and does not injuriously affect its
future welfare." * * * "When the
correction administered is not in itself
immoderate, and not, therefore, beyond
the authority of the teacher, its legality
or illegality must depend entirely on
the quo animo with which it was administered. Within the sphere of his authority the master is the judge when
correction is required, and of the degree
of correction necessary; and like all
others imparted with a discretion, he
cannot be made penally responsible for
error of judgment, but only for wickedness of purpose."
See also Commonwealth v. Seed, 5Pa. Law Jour. Rep. 78.
In Commonwealth v. Randall, 4 Gray
36, however, where, on the trial of an
indictment of a schoolmaster for an assault on a pupil, the judge refused to
instruct the jury that the defendant was
criminally liable for punishing a pupil,
only when he acted malo animo, from
vindictive feeling, passion or ill-will, or
inflicted more punishment than was
necessary to subdue the pupil and secure
obedience, and not for errors of opinion
or mistakes of judgment merely, provided he was governed by an honest
purpose to promote the discipline and
highest welfare of the school and the
best interests of the pupil ; and in-
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structed them that in inflicting corporal
punishment a teacher must exercise
reasonable judgment and discretion,
and be governed as to the mode and
severity of the punishment by the nature of the offence, the age, size, and
apparent power of endurance of the
pupil, and left it to the jury to decide
whether under all the facts the punishment was excessive, it was held that the
defendant had no ground of exception.
In Lander v. &aver, 32 Vt. 114, substantially the same conel-,ion was arrived at, with the qualification that if
there is any reasonable doubt whether
the punishment was excessive, the master should have the benefit of the doubt.
Admitting, then, the right of the
teacher to chastise the pupil moderately,
whenever the correction, as confessed by
the pleadings, or as proved on trial, appears to have been clearly excessive and
cruel, it must be adjudged illegal: Burlington v. Essex, 19 Vt. 102, 108;
Cooper v. Mc.Junkin, 4 Ind. 290; Lander v. S waer, 32 Vt. 114: Anderson v.
Te State, 3 Head 455.
As respects the limits of the jurisdiction over the pupil as to time and place,
in Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, it is
said to be conceded that the right to
punish extends to school hours, and that
there seems to be no reasonable doubt
that the supervision and control of the
master over the pupil extends from the
time he leaves home to go to school till
he returns home from school. In the
same case it was also held that, although a schoolmaster has in general
no right to punish a pupil for miscon.
duct committed after the dismissal of
school for the day and the return of
the pupil to his home, yet he may, on
the pupil's return to school, punish him
for any misbehavior, though committed
out of school, which has a direct and
immediate tendency to injure the school
and subvert the master's authority.
See, however, Murphy v. Board of Directors, 30 Iowa 429, where, however,

the decision was based upon a statute
authorizing the directors to dismiss any
pupils from school for gross immorality,
or for persistent violation of the regzdalions of the school.
Where, however, under a statute authorizing the board of directors to make
and enforce all needful rules and regulations for the government, management,
and control of schools, as they should
think proper, not inconsistent with the
laws of the land, a board of directors
made a rule that no pupil should, during
the school term, attend a locial party,
and the plaintiff, a pupil of the school,
by permission of his parents, violated
the rule and was expelled from the
school for so doing; in an action, against
the directors to recover damages for the
expulsion, it was held, that under the
law they had power to make needful
rules for the government of pupils while
at school, but no power to follow them
home and govern their conduct while
under the parental eye; and that in
prescribing such. rule they had exceeded their power and had invaded the
rights of the parents : Dritt v. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286.
As respects the age of the pupil, if a
person, who has attained his majority,
voluntarily attends school, creating the
relation of teacher and pupil, he thereby
waives any privilege which his age confers, subjects himself to like discipline
with those who are 'Within the school
age, and may be punished for refractory
conduct. And the teacher in such case
will escape liability therefor upon proof
that the chastisement was u-der all the
circumstances reasonable: The &ate v.
M ier, 45 Iowa 248 ; &evens v. Fassett,
27 Me. 266, 287.
The master.of a school may als9 impose reasonable restraint upon the per.
sons of his pupils, either by way of
prevention or punishment of disorderly
conduct : Fitzgeraldv. Northcote, 4 Fost.
& Fin. 656, per COCKBURN, C. J.; 1
Bl. Com. 453; Cooley on Torts 172.
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The power of teachers and school
directors, or other officers having the
supervision and control of schools, to
make rules and regulations for the government of the schools, has been referred to in some of the cases already cited.
Where their authority is not expressly
defined by statute it may be said in general terms that such rules and regulations
must be reasonable. The teacher has
not, as it seems, a discretionary power
of expulsion, but only for reasonable
cause: Fitzgerald v. Northcote, 4 Fost.
& Finlayson 656, 685, per CocxBunN,
C. J.
In Massachusetts it is held that the
school committee of a town have power
to pass all reasonable rules and regulations for the government, discipline, and
management of the public schools under
their general charge and superintendence: Roberts v. Boston, 5 Cush. 198;
,.Iernms
v. Charleston, 8 Id. 160;
Spiller y. Woburn, 12 Allen 127: Hodgkins v. Rockport, 105 Mass. 475.
A school committee has, in Massachusetts, authority, not subject to revision, if
exercised in good faith, to exclude a
pupil from a public school for misconduct which injures its discipline and
management, such conduct not being
mutinous or gross, or consisting of a
refusal to obey the commands of the
teachers, or of any outrageous proceeding, but of acts of neglect, carelessness
of posture in his seat and recitation,
tricks of playfulness, and inattention
to study and the regulations of the
school in minor matters: Hodgkins v.
Rockport, 105 Mass. 476 ; see also Ftzgeraldv. Northoote, 4 Fost. & Fin 656,
687.
The general school committee of a
city or town have power, under the laws
of Massachusetts, in order to maintain
the purity and discipline of the public
schools, to exclude therefrom a child
whom they deem to be of a licentious
and immoral character, although such
character is not manifested by any acts
VOL. XXVII.-31

of licentiousness or immorality within
the school : Sherman v. Inhabitants of
Charleston, 8 Csh. 160.
The school committee of a town may,
it is held, lawfully pass an order that
the schools thereof shall be opened each
morning with reading from the Bible
and prayer, and that during the prayer
each pupil shall bow the head, unless
his parents request that he shall be excused from doing so; and may lawfully
exclude from the school a pupil who refuses to comply with such order, and
whose parents refuse to request that he
shall be excused from doing so: Spiller
v. Inhabitantsof Woburn, 12 Allen 127.
See also Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me.
376. As to the exclusion of the Bible
from the schools, see Cooley on Torts
289 ; Board of Educatzon v. Minor, 23
Ohio St. 211.
School directors have in Ilinois no
power to expel a pupil for any reasosi
except disobedient, refractory or incorrigibly bad conduct, and for these only
after all other means have failed : Rulison v. Post, 79 I1. 567. And all rules
and regulations adopted by school directors must be reasonable and calculated to promote the object of the lawthe conferring upon all, free of charge,
such an education as they are by law
entitled to receive: Rulison v. Post,
supra.

' Under a statute authorizing the making of reasonable and proper rules for
the government of schools, a rule providing that pupils may be suspended
from school in case they shall be absent
or tardy, except for sickness or other
unavoidable cause, a certain number of
times, is a reasonable and proper rule
for the government of a school: Burdick
v. Babcock, 31 Iowa 562.
The prudential committee of a school
district may, it has been held in Vermont, exclude children from further attendance upon a term of school, for
absence contrary to the rules thereof,
though such absence be pursuant to the
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command of their
orman Catholic
parents, and by direction of their priest,
for the purpose of attending religious
services on Corpus Christi day: Ferriter
v. Tyler, 15 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 570;
a. o. 48 Vt. 444.
A requirement by the teacher of a
district that the pupils in grammar
schools shall write English compositions, is a reasonablb one ; and if
such a pupil, in the absence of any request from his parents that he may be
excused from so doing, refuse to comply
with such a requirement, he may be
expelled from school on that account:
Guernsey v. Pitkin, 32 Vt. 224.
So, where one of the rules adopted by
the board of education provided that if
any pupil should fail to be prepared
with a rhetorical exercise at the time
appointed therefor, he or she should,
unless excused on account of sickness
or other reasonable cause, be immediately suspended from the department,
the rule was held reasonable, and
neither the teacher of the department
nor the board of education were liable
in damages for the suspension of a pupil
for a failure to comply with the rule or
to offer any excuse therefor: ewell v.
Board of Education, 29 Ohio St. 89.
Whether an action will lie against a
teacher for refusing to instruct those
who lawfully come to Lim for instructhn, or whether the remedy is confined
to an Appeal to the governing board,
Judge Cooasr says, in his work on
Torts, p. 288, is left in doubt on the
authorities, though he expresses the
reasonable opinion that such refusal is
actionable. The parent of a child expelled from a public school by order of
the superintending school committee,
can, it is held, maintain no action
against them for such expulsion : Dona.
hoe v. Ricards, 38 Me. 376 ; &ephenson
v. Hall, 14 Barb. 222. So, in Spear v.
Cummings, 23 Pick. 224", it was held that

the teacher of a town school was not
liable to an action by a parent for refusing to instruct his children. See,
also, Learock v. Putnam, 1ii Mass.
499. If an action can be maintained
in such case, it should be in the name
of the child and for his benefit: Stephenson v. Hall, supra. See, however,
contra, Roe v. Deming, 21 Ohio St.
666, where an action for a wrongful expulsion of the child was held to lie in
favor of the parent against both the
teacher and the local directors. The
rule in Massachusetts has also been
changed by statute: Stat. 1845, c. 214.
See, also, as to action by pupil for expelling him from school: Drittv. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286.
As to the right of placing colored
pupils in different schools, see the cases
collected in Cooley on Torts 287, 288.
As to the right of the state over children in respect to reform and industrial
schools, see People ex rel. O'Connel v.
Turner, 10 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 366,
and note; . C. 55 Ill. 280; Milwaukee Industrial Schol v. Supervisors,
40 Wis. 328; Prescottv. State, 19 Ohio
St. 184; Cooley's Const. Lin. *299.
The principal case seems to be the
first in which the particular point decided (viz., whether, in a proper case
and where not deprived oi the power by
affirmative action of the proper board
or by statute, the teacher can suspend a
pupil from the privileges of the school),
has ever been passed upon. At least no
case has been found passing upon it.
The power to expel for a reasonable
cause was hinted at in Fi.tzgerald v.
Northcote, but the question of expulsion
was not necessary to the decision of the
case. The rule laid down in the princijal case.seems, however, so eminently
reasonable and proper, that we cannot
doubt that it will establish the law upon
this point.
MAunsuLL D. EwELL.
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The owners of land bounded on a harbor own only to high-water mark. They
have a right to construct wharves upon the soil below that line, if they conform
to such regulations as the state shall see fit to prescribe, and do not obstruct navigation.
The duty of protecting the paramount right of navigatibn rests upon the legislature, and they are to determine for themselves by what methods and instrumentalities they will discharge it.
They have power to vest in commissioners appointed by themselves, authority
to restrain riparian proprietors from extending structures into navigable waters.
The enactment of such a law is in no sense an exercise of the right of eminent
domain. The public do not appiopriate or use any right of the landowner in the
soil of the shore.
The Act of 1872, establishing a board of commissioners for New Haven harbor,
to be appointed by the governor, with the advice of the senate, in one section
gives the board power to prevent and remove encroachments upon the waters of
the harbor; in another section authorizes them to prescribe harbor lines beyond
which no structure should be extended, giving notice to all persons interested to
appear and be heard, and making a report to the General Assembly, and in another
section makes any structure within the tide-waters of the harbor not approved by
the commissioners a public nuisance, and authorizes the commissioners to bring
suits in the name of the state to stop any such erection. Hed,
1. That the act was constitutional and valid.
2. That it was not necessary for the commissioners to establish a general harbor line before forbidding or removing any particular encroachments.
The act was passed in 1872. By the revision of 1875 it was provided that all
public laws not contained in the revision, except acts which though public in form
were of a private nature, and some others, were thereby repealed. This act was
not contained in the revision. By an established custom the acts of each year
were published by the secretary of state in two pamphlets, one called "1Public Acts" and the other "Private Acts and Resolutions." * This act was published
among the private acts for the year 1872. Held, that it was to be presumed that
the legislature acted with reference to this usage and to the classification made by
the secretary in this instance, and intended to preserve the act in question under
the description of acts which though public in form were of a private nature.

ON motion for ifijunction.
The General Assembly in 1872 passed an act by which the governor was authorized and directed to appoint a Board of Harbor
Commissioners for New Haven harbor. The material parts of the
act, so far as this case is concerned, are as follows:
See. 2. Said Board of Harbor Commissioners shall have the general care
and supervision of New Haven harbor and its tide waters, and of all the fiats
and lands flowed thereby, in order to prevent and remove unauthorized encroachments and causes of every kind which are liable to interfere with the
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full navigation of said harbor, or in any way injure its channels, or czuse
any reduction of its tide waters. * * *
See. 3. Whenever, in the judgment of said Board of Harbor Commissionera, the public good requires, they may prbceed to prescribe harbor lines in
said harbor, beyond which no wharf, pier, or other structure shall be extended
into said harbor, and shall report the same for the consideration of the General Assembly at its next session. Provided, hwwever, that said commissioners
before drawing any such line, shall appoint a convenient time and place for
hearing all persons interested, &c.
Sec. 4. All persons contemplating the building over said harbor and tide
waters any bridge, wharf, pier, or dam, or the filling any flats, or driving any
piles below high-water mark, shall, before beginning it, give written notice
to said commissioners of the work they intend to do, and submit plans of any
proposed wharf or other structure, and of the flats to be filled, and of the
mode in which the work is to be performed ; and no such work shall be commenced until the plan and mode of performing the same shall be approved
in writing by a majority of said commissioners, and said commissioners shall
have power to alter said plans at their discretion, and to prescribe the direction, limits and mode of building the wharves and other structures, and all
such works shall be executed under the supervision of said commissioners.
Sec. 6. Any erection or work hereafter made in any manner not sanctioned
by said commissioners, where their direction is required as hereinbefore provided, within tide waters flowing into or through said harbor, shall be
deemed, and is hereby detlared to be, a public nuisance. Said commissioners
shall have power to order suits in the name of- the sate to prevent or stop by
injunction or otherwise, any such erection or other nuisance in the tide
waters flowing into or through said harbor, &c.

..

In June 1877, the respondents, being riparian proprietors upon
New Haven harbor, exhibited to the commissioners appointed under
said act a plan of a, wharf which they proposed to extend from their
shore line into the harbor. The commissioners disapproved of the
plan and refused them permission to build as proposed. They began to execute the work without such permission and were enjoined
by the Superior Court upon the motion of the commissioners. That
court then asked the advice of this court as to what decree should
be passed upon a motion to make the injunction perpetual.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARDEE, J.-By the common law as it stood long before the
coming of our ancestors to this country mid the settlement of the
colony at New Haven, the king, as parens patrmw held the title to"
the soil under the sea between high and low-water mark; he held
it not for his own benefit but for his siubjects at large , and for the
subjects of all states at peace with him; he held it in trust, for
public uses, established by ancient custom or regulated by law, the
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most important of which are those of fishing and navigation. In
1662 Charles II. granted all the lands of the colony by charter to
the freemen incorporated thereby. This court said, in Church v.
Meeker, 34 Conn. 421, that there had been in this state no judicial determination of the question whether or not that charter conveye.d the royal title to the shores of the sea; that the Supreme
Courts of Massachusetts, New Jersey and the United States, having each decided that similar grants did, under the head of " royalties," convey such title, this court would follow them and declare
that the title to the "shores of the sea" rested in the freemen of
the colony before the king was excluded by the revolution and independence; and that they, through their legislature, may therefore now exercise all the powers which-previous to the grant could
have been exercised either by the king alone.or by him in conjunction with his parliament, subject only to those restrictions which
have been imposed by the constitution of this state or of the United
States.
The respondents as owners of land bounded on a harbor, own
only to high-water mark. It is true they have a right to construct
wharves upon the soil below that line if they conform to such regulations as the state shall see fit to impose upon them, and do not
obstruct the paramount right of navigation. From their land
bounding upon the shore they hold the exclusive right to embark
and go upon the sea, for the reason that no other person can enter
upon their land for embarcation or for any other purpose, without.
their permission; but every person has the superior right to navigate the waters opposite thereto without obstruction from any structare erected by them.
The duty of protecting this dominant right rests upon the legislature ; and they are to determine for themselves by what methods
and instrumentalities they will discharge it. It is plain that they
themselves cannot descend to the making of frequent examinations
into the situation of each riparian proprietor upon our extended coast.
There is no bar in reason, and none in the constitution, to the vesting in commissioners appointed by themselves the power to restrain
such proprietors from extending structures into navigable waters;
they part with no legislative power; they enact the law; the commissioners, by the aid of the courts, enforce it. Besides, this mode
of performing the service which the legislature owes to the commerce of the world, has so often received both legislative and judi-
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cial sanction in other jurisdictions that it is now quite too late to
challenge it.
The enactment of the law is in no sense an exercise of the right
of eminent domain; it is not that taking of private property for
public use for which compensation is to be made. The'public do
not propose in any manner to appropriate or use any right of the
respondents in the soil of the shore, but only to guard against any
invasion by them of' the paramount right of the public to navigate
the waters over it; to enforce against them the maxim sic uere
tuo ut aZie m non ledas.

It is only the exercise of the police or

supervisory power vested in the legislature; the power to enact
such laws as they deem reasonable and necessary for the regulatio
of the use by riparisn proprietors of their qualified right to the soil
of the shore. Indeed, no individual is the absolute owner of any
land in so high a sense as that he can set the legislature at defiance
as to the use he may make of it; as part of the price to be paid for
the privilege of living under law he subjects himself to certain restrictions for the public good; to limitations upon the profitable use
of his property for the promotion of the general welfare. The prohibitions against wooden buildings, power magazines and slaughterhouses in cities are common instances of this.'
The shore line is singular, broken by alternate indentations and
projections, and the deep-water channel is at every possible angle
with, and at varying distances from it. The unrestrained desire
of proprietors to build first and farthest leads them to invade and
obstruct the channel. Hence the occasion for legislative interference for the preserration of the acknowledged right of all vessels
to access to all wharves. Neither in its provisions nor in its mode
of execution is the act in violation of any of the fundamental
principles of the social compact ; on the contrary its effect is greatly
for the wealth and ipeace of the public. The manner of its enforcement is open and fair. The respondents first advised the commissioners specifically of their plans ; this opened the door for a
hearing; after hearing and consideration the latter advised them
that the proposed structure would obstruct the public right of
navigation. Here was a day in court; a day before a tribunal
presumably impartial and specially qualified to determine the
precise matter intrusted to them.
Nor does the law become partial and individual in its scope and
operation, for the reason that the commissioners -are clothed with
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power to limit the extent to, which any proprietor may reach out
from his shore line towards or into navigable waters, and that it
therefore will result that A., B. and 0. will be permitted to build
wharves of different lengths. The location of the land of each,
the configuration of his shore-line, the relative position of the
channel, and the outline of the whole harbor, as it bears upon his
particular case, and all to be taken into consideration and weighed
by the commissioners; they are to determine the largest measure
of use of his right to the shore which each can enjoy consistently
with the greatest benefit to the public. And this general rule is to
be applied alike to the respondents and all other owners; each is
to surrender precisely what is necessary to prevent his wharf from
being an obstruction. Therefore, so far as the law and the reason
of its being are concerned, the surrender by each is precisely the
same.
We are to take notice that the wharves in New Haven harbor
hae now become numerous and valuable; that the effort to extend
them has invited public attention and legislative interference; that
the act in question is an exception to the ordinary rule by which
laws operate only after the adjournment of the legislature enacting
them, and is made to take effect upon its passage.' From these
facts we are to infer that, so far forth as its protecting power is
concerned, it was intended for immediate effect; and this is the
interpretation to be put upon it. We regard the establishment of
a harbor line as a matter quite apart from the duty of the commissioners to take the harbor at once into their keeping. - The existence of such a line spanning the whole harbor is not at all
necessary to the exercise of their restraining-power over a structure
immediately to be built.
The high-and low-water lines, and the course of the" channel
being known, they have all necessary data for action in reference
to each case as it arises.
But if in their opinion the public right of navigation could be
more perfectly protected, and the conflicting claims of proprietors
more satisfactorily adjusted by the immediate establishment of a
line for the whole harbor, in advance of any intention to build
wharves, they are authorized to advise the legislature as to the
course which in their judgment such a line should follow; but it is
obvious that its highest usefulness could only be secured by the
immediate exercise of the power to hold all proprietors in check
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until there is opportunity for legislative action. So far as the
erection of any proposed wharf is concerned, they must act at once,
so far as this general line is concerned they may act at once or
never.
By section 1, title 22, page 551, of the Revision -of 1875, it is
enacted as follows: Iall public laws, not contained in the foregoing titles, except acts of incorporation, confirming acts, acts
which though public in form are of a private nature, and all public
laws except such as by particular provision and this title are continued in force, are repealed."
The respondents urge that the act in question is public, both in
form and nature, and therefore is not saved by any of the foregoing
exceptions.
After the close of each session of the legislature the secretary
of the state has given notice to the public of the acts passed by
publishing a part of them in one pamphlet as "public acts;" and
a part in another pamphlet as "private acts and resolutions." The
act before us, passed in 1872, was published in the pamphlet of
private acts and resolutions for that year. This classification, it is
true, was that of the secretary and not of the legislature; but
there the public found it, and overlooking the distinctions between
public in form but of a private nature, and acts public in form but
of a special nature, came to regard and speak of this as private;
and presumably the legislature of 1875, the members of which
were of this public, intended to include it in, and save it under
the description of "acts which though public in form are of a
private nature." Indeed the same legislature, in section 19, page
438, of the Revision of 1875, provided that "the private or special
acts of this state shall be legal evidence, and the courts shall take
judicial notice of them;" seeming to use the terms "private"
and "special" as having the same general signification.
The legislature of 1869 had passed an act entitled "An act to
prevent and remove nuisances and obstructions from the channel
of Mill River." This channel is a part of the harbor of New
Haven, and the act is essentially of the same nature as the one in
question; but the same secretary saw fit to publish it in the
pamphlet of public acts for that year, and there the public found
it, and still disregarding distinctions, had come to regard this as a
public act. But the legislature of 1875, declares that though
public in form it is either local or private in its nature, and in the
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sixth section, protects it by special mention from any asseveration
even that the general words, "all public laws," in the first section
had repealed it. The act in question, that of 1872, never having
been printed with the public acts, and always having been regarded
as private in nature, stood in no need of such mention for its protection. The legislature recognising the fact that the general
understanding as to what laws are public and what are private, is
mainly the result of the official declarations made by the secretary
from year to year, adapted certain expressions both in the first and
in the sixth sections to this popular idea.
We think that the act in question has not been repealed.
We advise the Superior Court to grant the injunction.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
SAMUEL C. TAYLOR, ADM., v. J. H. FICKAS.
The owner of land on which there is a watercourse has a right to receive the
water in its natural channel, and to use it while passing over his land, but he is
required to return it to its channel when it leaves his land.
The owner of land is the absolute owner of aU water that lies on the surface of
it from rain-fall or the overflow of contiguous streams. And as "such owner, he
may fill up his land so as to prevent its being so overflowed.
An owner of laud which was liable to be overflowed at certain times of the year
by the rise of the Ohio river, planted a thick row of trees along the boundary
between his land and that next adjoining. The effect of this was to arrest the
drift-wood, and in times of overflow to back up the water on the adjoining land:
Held, that the adjoining owner had no cause of action.

ERROR to

Vanderburg Superior Court.

This was an action by' plaintiff as administrator of Martha E.
Taylor, who was in her lifetime the owner of a quarter section of
land near the Ohio river.
The plaintiff averred in his -declaration that during the year
1862, the defendant became the owner and entered into the possession of a stril$ off of said land, which lies in strips, each half
a mile in length, running north and south, and are situated near
the Ohio river, and are a part of the overflowed bottom lands lying
near said river; that from time immemorial a large extent of the
land has been and still is liable to be overflowed with water from
said river, after excessive rains in the valley of said river. That
during such times the water from said river flows over said tracts of
land with a rapid current, the general current running from east
Vor. XXVIL-32

TAYLOR v. FICKAS.

to west, first over lands of decedent and then of defendant. That
the water varies from two to ten feet in depth, and that the water
(which is in fact a part of said river) has run in that manner
during times of overflow from time immemorial; and that the same
would have continued to flow but for the wrongful acts of
defendant. That during such times drift-wood has floated in said
current over the lands in question without injury, and would have
continued so to float but for the wrongful acts of defendant.
That said lands were in a state of cultivation and were worth
$100 per acre. That the defendant, to protect his land from driftwood, in the year 1864, wrongfully and unlawfully planted and has
since continued and maintained a row of trees on his said land, on
the line dividing said tracts of land, in a continuous row or line for
a distance of half a mile, such trbes being planted only two feet
apart the whole length of said line.
That at the time decedent purchased said land the said trees had
but recently been planted, and were of small size, and were not
sufficient to form the obstruction hereafter complained of. That
said trees have been unlawfully maintained from the year 1867 to
the year 1874, having grown to a sufficient size and strength,
prevent the drift-wood from floating in said cufrent during times of
high-water; and during all these eight years, the drift-wood which
would have floated over and away from said decedent's land, and
from defendant's land, lodged upon and against the said trees and
upon said decedent's land in large quantities, so that a dam has
been and was formed against said trees and upon decedent's land,
by means whereof a large area of said land, to wit, five acres became
covered with said drift-wood, to the depth of from two to ten feet,
and which remains covered, by reason whereof the said lands
become and were worthless and of no value; by means whereof,
the~said decedent sustained damages to the amount of $2000, for
which he demands judgment or proper relief, &c., &c.
To this complaint, the appellee demurred, and the demurrer was
sustained.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BIDDLE, J.-If this complaint was brought solely in the right
of an administrator the action would not lie. An administrator
cannot sue for an injury to the freehold. .Emmersonv. .Enmerson,
1 Vent. 18T7; Ml v. Penny, 17 Me. 409; Toller on Ex., § 159.
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By the common law lands went to the heir, not to the administrator: 1 Blackst. 201. In the state of Indiana, the administrator has no right to the lands which descend to the heir, except upon
the contingency that the personal estate is insufficient to pay the
debts against the deceased, or in the absence of heirs or devisees.
2 R. S. (1876) 519 ; sec. 75, p. 535, sec. 110. And this is the
general American doctrine. The appellant cannot maintain the
case as an administrator, but in the body of the complaint he avers
that he is the sole heir of the decedent, and that the lands had
descended to him. As an heir he may bring this action.
The property in water that passes through a watercourse
which has a bed, channel and banks, where it usually flows, is a
mere usufruct interest, continuing only while the water is passing
over the lands of the owner.
He has the right to receive it where the watercourse in its natural
channel enters his land, and to use it while it is passing over his
land; but he is required to return it to its channel when it leaves
his land: Bouvier's Dict.; Angell on Watercourses, secs. 94, 135.
The property in the lost water that percolates the soil through
the surface of the earth in hidden recesses, without a known channel or cause, and property in the wild water that lies upon the
surface of the earth or temporarily flows over it, as the natural or
artificial elevations or depressions may guide or invite it, but without a channel, and which may be caused by the falling of rains or
the melting of snow or ice, or the rising of contiguous streams or
rivers, falls within the maxim that a man's land extends to the
centre of the earth below the surface, and to the skies above, and
is absolute in the owner of the land as being part of the land
itself. Angell on Watercourses, sec. 108; The N. A. & Salern
Railroad Co. v. Peterson, 14 Ind. 112, and The City of Greencastle, 23 Id. 186.
In the complaint before us there is no averment of any watercourse, except indeed, by way of parenthesis, that the place during
floods is a part of the Ohio river; but the facts averred show clearly
that it was not upon the bed of the river, nor within its channel,
nor between its banks; in short, that it is no part of a watercourse,
but that .the flow is over the entire surface of the land, is occasioned
by temporary causes, and is not usually there. The rights of the
appellee are therefore, such as a proprietor may have in surfacewater, which, as we have seen, is a part of his land; and the injuries
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or inconveniences which the appellant is alleged to have suffered,
are such as arise from the changes, accidents and vicissitudes of
natural causes. These rights and liabilities are so well defined by
BIGELOW, C. J., in the case of aammon v. Hargaden, 10 Allen
196, that we adopt the definition as our own.
"The right of an owner of laud to occupy and improve it in such
manner and for such purposes as he may see fit, either by changing
the surface or the erection of buildings or other structures thereon,
is not restricted or modified by the fact that his own land is so
situated, with reference to that of adjoining owners, that an alteration in the mode of its improvement or occupation in any portion
of it will cause water, which may accumulate thereon by rains and
snows falling upon its surface or flowing on to it over the surface
of adjacent lots, either to stand in unusual quantities on other adjacent lots, or pass into or over the same in greater quantities or in
other directions than they were accustomed to flow."
Again, from the same case:
"The obstruction of surface-water, or an alteration in the flow
of it, affords no cause of action, in behalf of a person who may suffer loss or detriment therefrom, against one who does no act inconsistent with the due exercise of dominion over his own soil." See
rules in 11 Am. Law Register, lay Mr. Justice

REDPLMD.

In delivering the opinion in the case of aoodale v. Tuttle, 29
N. Y. 459, DENIO, C. J., said: "1And in respect to the running
off of surface-water caused by rain or snow, I know of no principle
which will prevent the owner of land from filling up the wet or
marshy places on his own soil for its amelioration and his own
advantage because his neighbor's land is incommoded by it. Such
a doctrine would militate against the well-settled rule that the
owner of land has dominion over the whole space above and below
the surface."
The maxim "that every one must so enjoy his property as not to
injure the property of another," so earnestly insisted upon by the
appellee, means no more than that every one must so enjoy his
property according to his legal right as not to injure the legal rights
of another. It is sometimes impossible for the owner to use his
property within his legal right, without in some slight degree, at
least, injuring the property of another. Such a case is not within
the maxim, provided it does not injure a legal right in the property
of another. In the case of Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Caines 307,
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THOMPSoN, J., properly said; "The elements being for general
and public use, and the benefit appropriated to individuals by occupancy, this occupancy must be negotiated and guarded with a
view to individual rights of all who have an interest in their enjoyment; and the maxim sic utere tuum ut alienum non icedas must
be taken and construed with an eye to the natural rights of all;
and although some conflict may be produced in such uses and enjoyments, it is not considered in the judgment of the law an impairment
of the right. In case of Cikatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vermont 49, it is
said, "The maxim sic utere, &c., applies only to cases where the
act complained of violates some legal right of the party; and it
may be laid down as a position not to be controverted that an act
legal in itself violating n6 right, cannot be made actionable on the
ground of the motive which induced it."
It is plain that the facts averred in the complaint we are considering do not fill the law as expressed above.
The doctrine contended for by the appellant applied to the vast
alluvial regions---so generally level and subject to occasional inundations-bordering upon the Ohio river, and lying along large
-rivers and streams of this state, would very much embarrass agriculture and general improvement by preventing proprietors of lands
from securing their fences by planting trees, or by other permanent
methods, and in some instances perhaps render large portions of
our richest soil useless. While the owners of lands may not obstruct
watercourses to the injury of others, they must be permitted .to
fence and cultivate these fields, and improve their lands in the way
which best subserves their interests, without being responsible for
the accidents of floods or the shifting of surface-water occasioned
thereby, although -sometimes slight and temporary injuries may
result therefrom to adjoining owners. These are accidents which
must be borne alike by all.
We think the law has wisely discriminated between the rules
which apply to watercourses and those which apply to surface
waters. See the following authorities: iShields v. Arndt, 3
Greene 234; Bates v. South, 100 Mass. 181; Cooaale v. Tuttle,
29 N. Y. 459; Buffum v. 1arris, 5 R. 1. 243; Beard v. Mur.phy, 37 Vt. 99; Sweet v. Cutts, 50 N. H. 439; Bawston v.
Taylor, 11 Har. & G. 369; Hoyt v. City of Hudson, 27 Wis.
656 ; Barnesv Sabron, 10 Nev. 217.
The court did not err in sustaining the demurrer to the complaint, and
Judgment is affirmed.

